We determine the weakest failure detectors to solve several fundamental problems in distributed message-passing systems, for all environments -i.e., regardless of the number and timing of crashes. The problems that we consider are: implementing an atomic register, solving consensus, solving quittable consensus (a variant of consensus in which processes have the option to decide 'quit' if a failure occurs), and solving non-blocking atomic commit.
INTRODUCTION
Consensus is a classical problem in fault tolerant distributed computing. Informally, each process in the system initially proposes a value, and eventually processes must reach a common decision on one of the proposed values. Non-blocking atomic commit (NBAC) is a closely related problem that arises in distributed transaction processing [10] . Informally, the set of processes that participate in a transaction must agree on whether to commit or abort that transaction. Initially each process votes Yes ("I am willing to commit") or No ("we must abort"), and eventually processes must reach a common decision, Commit or Abort. The decision to Commit can be reached only if all processes voted Yes. Furthermore, if all processes voted Yes and no failure occurs, then the decision must be Commit.
It is well-known that consensus and NBAC are unsolvable in asynchronous systems with process crashes (even if communication is reliable) [8] . One way to circumvent such impossibility results is through the use of unreliable failure detectors [4] : In this model, each process has access to a failure detector module that provides some (possibly incomplete and inaccurate) information about failures, e.g., a list of processes currently suspected to have crashed. Chandra et al. [3] determined the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in sytems with a majority of correct processes. 1 It was not known, however, whether there is a weakest failure detector to solve consensus regardless of the number of faulty processes -and, if so, what that failure detector is.
One of the results of this paper is to determine the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in any environment whatsoever. (We will formally define the term "environment" in Section 2. Informally, however, an environment encapsulates an arbitrary assumption about which processes crash and when they do. Examples of environments are: a majority of the processes are correct; process p never fails before process q; no process crashes after it has taken at least one step.) To obtain this result, we exploit a close relationship between consensus and atomic registers. We determine the weakest failure detector to implement such registers in any environment -a previously unexplored question of independent interest. We then leverage this result to determine the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in any environment.
As with consensus, failure detectors can be used to solve NBAC [9, 11] . It was an open problem, however, whether there is a weakest failure detector to solve NBAC and, if so, what that failure detector is. The answer to this question was not known even for environments with a majority of correct processes. In this paper we resolve this problem, again for any environment. To do so, we first introduce a natural variation of consensus, called quittable consensus (QC) -a problem that is interesting in its own right. We then determine the weakest failure detector to solve QC in all environments, and establish a close relationship between QC and NBAC. Using this, we determine the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC in any environment.
We now describe in more detail our results; these involve the following three failure detectors.
• The quorum failure detector Σ outputs a set of processes at each process. Any two sets (output at any times and by any processes) intersect, and eventually every set output at correct processes consists only of correct processes [7] .
• The leader failure detector Ω outputs the id of a process at each process. There is a time after which it outputs the id of the same correct process at all correct processes [3] .
• The failure signal failure detector FS outputs green or red at each process. As long as there are no failures, FS outputs green at every process; after a failure occurs, and only if it does, FS must eventually output red permanently at every correct process [5, 11] .
The weakest failure detector to implement an atomic register. It is well-known that in asynchronous message-passing systems it is possible to implement atomic registers if and only if a majority of processes are correct [1] . The question naturally arises whether using some sort of failure detectors it is possible to implement atomic registers even in environments where fewer than a majority of processes can be relied upon to be correct. We prove that the quorum failure detector Σ is the weakest one to do so in any environment. One may wonder how this can be the case, since in environments with a majority of correct processes atomic registers can be implemented without any failure detector. The answer is that, in such environments, we can easily implement Σ ex nihilo as follows: Each process periodically sends "join-quorum" messages, and takes as its present quorum any majority of processes that respond to that message. Thus, to implement registers in environments with a majority of correct processes we "need" something that we can get for free! Like any weakest failure detector result, this one has two aspects: We must prove that in any environment,
(1) using Σ we can implement registers; and (2) any failure detector that can be used to implement registers can be transformed to Σ.
(1) will not surprise anyone familiar with the algorithm of Attiya et al. for implementing registers in a message-passing system [1] :
Where that algorithm uses majorities to ensure that a read operation returns the most recently written value, we can use the quorums provided by Σ to the same effect. (2) is far less obvious; it is discussed in Section 3.
The weakest failure detector to solve consensus. It is known that the leader failure detector Ω is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in environments with a majority of correct processes. More specifically, (3) using Ω we can solve consensus if a majority of processes are correct [4] ; and (4) any failure detector that can be used to solve consensus can be transformed to Ω [3] .
It is important to note that (4) holds for all environments.
In this paper we show that the failure detector (Ω, Σ) is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in all environments. 2 This result is obtained in the following way. It is known that using registers and Ω we can solve consensus in any environment [19] . By (1), it follows that using (Ω, Σ) we can solve consensus in any environment. Conversely, let D be a failure detector that can be used to solve consensus in an arbitrary environment E . From Lamport's work on the state-machine approach we know that by using consensus we can implement any object, and in particular registers [17, 21] . Thus, using D we can implement registers in E . By (2) , D can be transformed to Σ in E . Since, by (4) , D can also be transformed to Ω in E , we conclude that D can be transformed to
The fact that (Ω, Σ) is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in any environment, implies that Ω is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus when a majority of processes are correct, since as we noted earlier, in such environments Σ can be implemented ex nihilo. Thus the result we show in this paper is a natural generalisation of the previously known result about the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in environments with a majority of correct processes [3, 4] .
The weakest failure detectors to solve QC and NBAC. Informally, QC is like consensus except that, in case a failure occurs, processes have the option (but not the obligation) to agree on a special value Q (for "quit"). This weakening of consensus is appropriate for applications where, when a failure occurs, processes are allowed to agree on that fact (rather than on an input value) and resort to a default action.
Despite their apparent similarity, QC and NBAC are different in important ways. In NBAC the two possible input values Yes and No are not symmetric: A single vote of No is enough to force the decision to abort. In contrast, in QC (as in consensus) no input value has a privileged role. Another way in which the two problems differ is that the semantics of the decision to abort (in NBAC) and the decision to quit (in QC) are different. In NBAC the decision to abort is sometimes inevitable (e.g., if a process crashes before voting); in contrast, in QC the decision to quit is never inevitable, it is only an option. Moreover, in NBAC the decision to abort signifies that either a failure has occurred or someone voted No; in contrast, in QC the decision to quit is allowed only if a failure has occurred.
We first show that there is a weakest failure detector to solve QC. This failure detector, which we denote Ψ, behaves as follows: For an initial period of time the output of Ψ at each process is ⊥. Eventually, however, Ψ either behaves like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes or, if a failure occurs, it may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. The switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS need not occur simultaneously at all processes, but the same choice is made by all processes. This result has an intuitively appealing interpretation: To solve QC, a failure detector 2 If D and D are failure detectors, (D, D ) is the failure detector that outputs a vector with two components, the first being the output of D and the second being the output of D . must eventually either truthfully inform all processes that a failure has occurred, in which case the processes can decide Q, or it must be powerful enough to allow processes to solve consensus on their proposed values. This matches the behavior of Ψ.
We then prove that NBAC is equivalent to QC "modulo" the failure detector FS. More precisely we show that: (a) given FS, any QC algorithm can be transformed into an algorithm for NBAC, and (b) any algorithm for NBAC can be transformed into an algorithm for QC, and can also be used to implement FS.
Finally, we use this equivalence to prove that (Ψ, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC. This result applies to any system, regardless of the number of faulty processes.
Related work. The question of the weakest failure detector for consensus was first addressed in [3] , where it was shown that failure detector Ω is the weakest to solve consensus with a majority of correct processes. The generalization of the result to other environments was partially addressed in [6] . The same paper addressed the question of the weakest failure detector to implement atomic registers for specific environments and within a restricted class of failure detectors.
NBAC has been studied extensively in the context of transaction processing [10, 22] . Its relation to consensus was first explored in [14] . Charron-Bost and Toueg [5] and Guerraoui [11] showed that despite some apparent similarities, in asynchronous systems NBAC and consensus are in general incomparable -i.e., a solution for one problem cannot be used to solve the other. 3 The problem of determining the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC was explored and settled in special settings. Fromentin et al. [9] determine that to solve NBAC between every pair of processes in the system, one needs a perfect failure detector [4] . Guerraoui and Kouznetsov [13] determine the weakest failure detector for NBAC within a restricted class of failure detectors; while from results of [5] and [11] it follows that in the special case where at most one process may crash, FS is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC. The general question, however, was open until the present paper.
Several versions of the consensus problem have been studied before but, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose quittable consensus.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we briefly review the model of computation, and define formally the failure detectors Ω, Σ and FS. In Section 3 we prove that Σ is the weakest failure detector to implement registers in any environment.In Section 4 we prove that (Ω, Σ) is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in any environment. In Section 5 we give the exact specification of QC, and in Section 6 we prove that Ψ is the weakest failure detector to solve QC. In Section 7 we give the specification of NBAC, we prove that NBAC is equivalent to QC modulo FS, and we use this to show that (Ψ, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC. The missing proofs can be found in [7, 12] .
MODEL
We consider the asynchronous message-passing model in which processes have access to failure detectors [3, 4] . In this section we summarise the relevant terminology and notation.
The system consists of a set Π of n processes. Processes can fail only by crashing, i.e., prematurely halting. Each process executes steps asynchronously: the delays between steps are finite 3 An exception is the case where at most one process may fail. In this case, NBAC can be transformed into consensus, but the reverse does not hold. but unbounded and variable. Processes are connected via reliable links that transmit messages with finite but unbounded and variable delay.
A failure pattern is a function F : AE → 2 Π , where F (t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. (We assume a discrete global clock used only for presentational convenience, and not accessible by the processes.) Crashed processes do not recover and so, for all t ∈ AE,
denotes the set of processes that crash in F , and correct (F ) = Π − faulty(F ) denotes the set of processes that are correct in F .
A failure detector history with range R describes the behavior of a failure detector during an execution; formally, it is a function An algorithm A is an automaton that specifies, for each process p, (a) the set of messages that p can send; (b) the set of states that p can occupy (a subset of which are identified as p's possible initial states); and (c) a transition function which determines the messages that p sends and the new state it occupies when it takes a step. In one atomic step, p performs the following actions: it receives a message addressed to it (possibly the empty message λ), it queries the failure detector and receives its present value, it sends messages to other processes and changes its state. 4 The messages that p sends and the new state it occupies are specified by its transition function based on its present state, the message it receives and the value it was given by the failure detector. Formally, a step is a triple p, m, d , where p is the process taking the step, m is the message p receives in that step, and d is the failure detector value it sees in that step. A schedule S is a finite or infinite sequence of steps.
A configuration of algorithm A specifies the global state of the system, i.e., the state of each process and of the "message buffer" which contains the set of messages that have been sent but have not yet been received. An initial configuration of A is a configuration in which every process occupies an initial state and the message buffer is empty. The step e = p, m, d is applicable to configuration C if m is λ or m belongs to the message buffer of C and its recipient is p; in this case e(C) denotes the configuration that results if the present configuration is C, and process p executes the step in which it receives message m and sees failure detector value d. A schedule S = e1e2 . . . is applicable to configuration C if and only if S is empty or e1 is applicable to C, e2 is applicable to e1(C) and so on. If S is a finite schedule applicable to C, S(C) denotes the configuration that results from applying S to C.
A run of algorithm A using a failure detector D describes an execution of A where processes have access to D. Formally, a run (respectively, partial run) of algorithm A using a failure detector D is a tuple R = F, H, I, S, T where F is a failure pattern, H ∈ D(F ) is a failure detector history, I is an initial configuration of A, S is an infinite (respectively, finite) schedule of A that is applicable to I, and T is an infinite (respectively, finite) increasing list of times indicating when each step in S occurred. A number of straightforward conditions are imposed on the components of runs and partial runs to ensure that the failure detector values that appear in the steps of the schedule are consistent with the failure detection history H, that processes don't take steps after crashing, and that (in runs) correct processes take infinitely many steps and messages are not lost. For details see [3] .
Some algorithms meet their specification only under some as-sumptions about the "environment" -e.g., that a majority of the processes are correct, or that two particular processes do not both crash. Formally, an environment E is a set of possible failure patterns. Intuitively, these are the failure patterns in which an algorithm of interest works correctly. In Section 1 we informally introduced the failure detectors Ω, Σ, FS. We now define these formally.
• The range of Ω is Π. For every failure pattern F ,
• The range of Σ is 2 Π . For every failure pattern F ,
• The range of FS is {green, red}. For every failure pattern F ,
THE WEAKEST FAILURE DETECTOR TO IMPLEMENT AN ATOMIC REGIS-TER
A register is a shared object accessed through two operations: read and write. The write operation takes as an input parameter a specific value to be stored in the register and returns a simple indication ok that the operation has been executed. The read operation returns the last value written in the register. The registers we consider are fault-tolerant and atomic [18] (linearizable [15] ): they ensure that, despite concurrent invocations and possible crashes of the processes, every correct process that invokes an operation eventually gets a reply (a value for the read and an ok indication for the write), and any operation appears to be executed instantaneously between its invocation and reply time events. (A precise definition is given in [2, 15] .) Theorem 1 For all environments E , Σ is the weakest failure detector to implement an atomic register in E . PROOF SKETCH. (A detailed proof is presented in [7] .)
To prove the sufficiency of Σ, we adapt the algorithm of [1] to show how an atomic register with one reader and one writer can be implemented with Σ. Then, using the classical of results [16, 23] , we deduce that atomic registers with multiple readers and writers can be implemented with Σ.
The proof that Σ is necessary to implement atomic registers is more intricate. We must show that any algorithm A that implements a register in some environment E using a failure detector D can be used to emulate the output of Σ. The transformation algorithm that does this is presented in Figure 1 .
In the transformation algorithm, every process pi maintains a variable Σ-output i . We now prove that for any two processes p k and p l , Σ-output k and Σ-output l (taken at any times) intersect (intersection, and, at every correct process pj, Σ-output j eventually consists only of correct processes (completeness).
The transformation algorithm uses n copies of the algorithm A that, using failure detector D, implement n atomic registers, denoted by Reg1, . . . Regn. Every process pi is associated with register Regi which can be written only by pi and read by all processes. There are three key ideas underlying our transformation algorithm:
(1) Every process pi periodically writes in Regi a counter k, together with a specific value that we will discuss below in item (3): the counter k is incremented for every new write performed by pi. Process pi determines the processes that participate in every write(k,*):
Let w b , respectively we, denote the beginning event, respectively the termination event of this write operation, and let be the causality relation of [17] , the set of participants in w, is the set of processes:
{pj ∈ Π|∃e event of pj : w b e we}
This set of participants is denoted by Pi(k).
Roughly speaking, this set is determined by having every process pj that receives some message m in the context of the k-th write from pi, tag every message that causally follows m, with k, pj, as well as the list of processes from which messages have been received with those tags. When pi terminates write(k,*), pi gathers in Pi(k) the participants in write(k,*).
An important property of Pi(k) is that it necessarily contains at least one correct process. Indeed, assume that Pi(k) contains no correct processes. Consider a read operation that takes place after every process in Pi(k) has crashed. Furthermore, assume that no message from processes in Pi(k), sent after the first event of write(k,*), reaches any process in Π − Pi(k) before the read operation completes. This scenario is possible, since no process in Π − Pi(k) participated in write(k,*). Then the read operation cannot return the value written by write(k,*) -a contradiction.
(2) Every process pi maintains a set of process sets, Ei, where each set within Ei consists of the processes that participated in some previous write performed by pi. Basically, before
Initially, Ei contains exactly one set: the set of all processes Π, i.e., we assume that Pi(0) = Π. Then, whenever pi terminates a write, it updates Ei.
An important property of the set Ei is that, eventually, all new sets (Pi(k)) that are added to Ei contain only correct processes. This is because after all faulty processes have crashed, the participants in new write operations are necessarily correct.
(3) The value that process pi writes in Regi, together with k (i.e., its k-th write), is the value of Ei after the (k − 1)-th write. After pi writes Ei in Regi, pi reads Regj for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Process pi selects at least one process pt from every set it reads (in some register Regj) by sending a message to all processes in this set and waiting for at least one reply. The value of the variable Σ-output i is the value of Pi(k − 1) augmented with every process pt that pi selected.
An important property of variable Σ-output i is that it is permanently updated if process pi is correct. This is because pi only waits for a message from one process in every set that it reads in a register, and every such set contains at least one correct process.
Code for each process p i : on initialization: Reg i .write(k, E i ); let P i (k) be the set of participants in the write In short, the completeness property of Σ is ensured since, for every correct process pi, Σ-output i eventually contains only correct processes. The key idea that ensures the intersection property of Σ is that every process pi writes in its register before reading all other registers and updating Σ-output i .
THE WEAKEST FAILURE DETECTOR TO SOLVE CONSENSUS

Specification of consensus
In the consensus problem, each process invokes the operation PROPOSE(v), where v ∈ {0, 1}, which returns a value v ∈ {0, 1}.
It is required that:
Termination: If every correct process proposes, then every correct process eventually returns a value.
Uniform Agreement: No two processes (whether correct or faulty) return different values.
Validity: If a process returns a value v, then v was proposed by some process.
The weakest failure detector to solve consensus
The following corollary states that consensus can be implemented using failure detector (Ω, Σ) in every environment. Such implementation can be achieved by first implementing registers out of Σ, and then consensus out of registers and Ω [19] : Corollary 2 For all environments E , (Ω, Σ) can be used to solve consensus in E .
The following corollary follows from [3] , Theorem 1 and the fact that consensus can be used to implement atomic registers in every environment [17, 21] 
QUITTABLE CONSENSUS (QC)
Informally, quittable consensus is a weaker version of consensus where, if a failure has occurred, processes can also agree on the special value Q. In the quittable consensus problem (QC), each process invokes the operation PROPOSE(v), where v ∈ {0, 1}, which returns a value of 0, 1 or Q (for "quit"). It is required that:
Termination: If every correct process proposes a value, then every correct process eventually returns a value. Here we defined the binary version of QC, where processes can propose values in the set {0, 1}. It is straightforward to generalise QC so that processes can propose values from an arbitrary set of at least two values that does not include the special value Q.
THE WEAKEST FAILURE DETECTOR TO SOLVE QC
We define a new failure detector denoted Ψ and show that it is the weakest failure detector to solve QC in any environment. To prove this, we first show that Ψ can be used to solve QC in any environment. We then prove that, for every environment E , any failure detector that can be used to solve QC in E can be transformed into Ψ in E .
Specification of failure detector Ψ
Roughly speaking Ψ behaves as follows: For an initial period of time the output of Ψ at each process is ⊥. Eventually, however, Ψ behaves either like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes, or, in case a failure previously occurred, it may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. The switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS need not occur simultaneously at all processes, but the same choice is made by all processes. Note that the switch from ⊥ to FS is allowable only if a failure previously occurred. On the other hand, if a failure does occur, processes are not required to switch from ⊥ to FS; they may still switch to (Ω, Σ).
More precisely, Ψ is defined as follows. For each failure pattern F , 
Using Ψ to solve QC
It is easy to use Ψ to solve QC in any environment E (see Figure 2) . Each process p waits until the output of Ψ becomes different from ⊥. At that time, either Ψ starts behaving like FS or it starts behaving like (Ω, Σ). If Ψ starts behaving like FS (Ψ can do so only if a failure previously occurred), p returns Q. The remaining case is that Ψ starts behaving like (Ω, Σ). It is shown in [7] that there is an algorithm that uses (Ω, Σ) to solve consensus in any environment. Therefore, in this case, processes propose their initial values to that consensus algorithm and return the value decided by that algorithm. In Figure 2 , CONSPROPOSE() denotes p's invocation of the algorithm that solves consensus using (Ω, Σ). Hence the following result:
Theorem 5 For all environments E , Ψ can be used to solve QC in E .
Extracting Ψ from any failure detector that solves QC
Let D be an arbitrary failure detector that can be used to solve QC in some environment E ; i.e., there is an algorithm A that uses D to solve QC in environment E . We must prove that Ψ can be "extracted" from D in environment E , i.e., processes can run in E a transformation algorithm that uses D and A to generate the output of Ψ -a failure detector that initially outputs ⊥ and later behaves either like (Ω, Σ) or like FS. The transformation algorithm that does this is shown in Figure 3 and is explained below.
Each process p starts by outputting ⊥ (line 1). While doing so, p determines whether in the current run it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ), or it is legitimate to start behaving like FS and output red because a failure occurred, as follows.
In task 1, p simulates runs of A that could have occurred in the current failure detector history of D and the current failure pattern F , exactly as in [3] . It does this by "sampling" its local module of D and exchanging failure detector samples with the other processes (line 4). Process p organizes these samples into an ever-increasing DAG Gp whose edges are consistent with the order in which the failure detector samples were actually taken. Using Gp, p simulates ever-increasing partial runs of algorithm A that are compatible with paths in Gp (line 6). 5 Each process p organizes these runs into a forest of n + 1 trees, denoted Υp. For any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th tree of this forest, denoted Υ i p , corresponds to simulated runs of A, 5 Each failure detector sample in Gp includes the name of the process that took this sample. Roughly speaking, we say that a run or schedule of A is compatible with a path in Gp if the sequence of processes that take steps in this run or schedule and the failure detector values that they see match the sequence of processes and failure detector values in this path [3] . all starting with the same initial configuration, namely the one in which processes p1, . . . , pi propose 1, and pi+1, . . . , pn propose 0. A path from the root of a tree to a node x in this tree corresponds to (the schedule of) a partial run of A, where every edge along the path corresponds to a step of some process. In task 2, p waits until it decides in some run of every tree of the forest Υp (line 8). If p decides Q in any of these runs, then a failure must have occurred (in the current failure pattern), and so p knows that it is legitimate to output red in this run. Otherwise (p's decisions in the simulated runs are 0s or 1s), p determines that it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ) in the current run.
At this point, p executes the given QC algorithm A (using failure detector D) to agree with all the other processes on whether to output red or to extract (Ω, Σ). Specifically, if p has determined that it is legitimate to output red (p decides Q in some run of Υp) then it proposes 0 to A (line 11). Otherwise, in each tree of Υp, p has a run in which it decides 0 or 1. In the tree where every process proposes 0 (respectively, 1), p's decision must be 0 (respectively, 1). Thus, there exist initial configuration I and I , and schedules S and S in Υp, such that I and I are initial configurations that differ only in the proposal of one process, and S and S are schedules in Υp such that p decides 0 in S(I) and 1 in S (I ). Then p proposes (I, I , S, S ) to A(line 14). 6 If A returns 0 or Q, then p stops outputting ⊥ and outputs red from that time on (line 18). If A returns a value of the form (I0, I1, S0, S1), then p stops outputting ⊥ and starts extracting Ω (line 22) and Σ (lines 24-32). Ω is extracted as in [3] (see Section 6.3.1). Σ is extracted using novel techniques explained in Section 6.3.2.
Note that processes use the given QC algorithm A and failure detector D in two different ways and for different purposes. First each process simulates many runs of A to determine whether it is legitimate to output red or it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ) in the current run. Then processes actually execute A (this is a real execution, not a simulated one) to reach a common decision on whether to output red or to extract (Ω, Σ). Finally, if processes decide to extract (Ω, Σ), they resume the simulation of runs of A to do this extraction.
Extracting Ω
To extract Ω, p must continuously output the id of a process such that, after some time, correct processes output the id of the same correct process. This is done using the procedure of [3] , with some minor differences explained below.
As in [3] , because of the way each process p constructs its everincreasing forest Υp of simulated runs, the forests of correct processes tend to the same infinite limit forest, denoted Υ. The limit tree of Υ i p is denoted Υ i . Each node x of the limit forest Υ is tagged by the set of decisions reached by correct processes in partial runs that correspond to descendants of x.
In [3] the only possible decisions were 0 or 1, and so these were the only possible tags. Consequently, each node was 0-valent, 1-valent or bivalent (with two tags). Here there are three possible decisions (0, 1 or Q) so each node is 0-valent, 1-valent, Q-valent or multivalent (with two or three tags).
In [3] (and here) the extraction of the id of a common correct process relies on the existence of a critical index i in the limit forest Υ. Here we define i to be critical if the root of Υ i is multivalent (in which case it is called multivalent critical), or if the root of Υ i−1 is u-valent and the root of Υ i is v-valent, where u, v ∈ {0, 1, Q} and u = v (in which case it is called univalent critical). 6 We assume here that A can solve multivalued QC. This causes no loss of generality: by using the technique of [20] one can transform any binary QC algorithm into a multivalued one.
In [3] it is shown that a critical index always exists. In this paper, however, this is not necessarily the case. If some process crashes (in the current failure pattern), it is possible that in all the simulated runs of QC algorithm A in Υ all decisions are Q. In this case, the roots of all trees in the limit forest Υ are tagged only with Q. So there is no critical index, and we cannot apply the techniques of [3] to extract the id of a correct process! This is why, in our transformation algorithm, processes do not always attempt to extract Ω from D. We will show, however, that if a process actually attempts to extract Ω (in line 22) then a critical index does exist in the limit forest Υ, and so Ω can indeed be extracted (Lemma 8 in [12] ).
Extracting Σ
To extract Σ, p must continuously output a set of processes (quorum) such that the quorums of all processes always intersect, and eventually they contain only correct processes. This is done in lines 24-32 as follows.
When process p reaches line 24, it has agreed with other processes on two initial configurations I0 and I1 and two schedules S0 and S1 that are applicable to I0 and I1, respectively. Consider the set C of configurations of A obtained by applying all the prefixes of S0 and S1 to I0 and I1 (line 25).
To determine its next quorum, p uses "fresh" failure detector samples to simulate runs of A that extend each configuration in C (lines 29-30). It does so until, for each configuration in C, it has simulated an extension in which it has decided (line 31). The quorum of p is the set of all processes that take steps in these "deciding" extensions (line 32).
Note that in line 27, p waits until it gets a new sample u from its failure detector module (which happens in line 4 of task 1) and then it uses only samples that are more recent than u to extend the configurations in C (lines 29-30). This ensures the freshness of the failure detector samples that p uses to determine its quorums. Consequently, quorums eventually contain only correct processes (one of the two requirements of Σ).
Theorem 6
For all environments E , if failure detector D can be used to solve QC in E , then the algorithm in Figure 3 transforms D into Ψ in environment E . PROOF SKETCH. Let A be any algorithm that uses D to solve QC in environment E . We show that the algorithm in Figure 3 uses A to transform D into Ψ in environment E . In that algorithm, each process p maintains a variable Ψ-output p . We now prove that the values that these variables take conform to the specification of Ψ. By inspection of Figure 3 , it is clear that Ψ-output p is either ⊥, or red (in which case we say it is of type FS), or a pair (q, Q) where q ∈ Π and Q ⊆ Π (in which case we say it is of type (Ω, Σ)).
( If p decides Q then the fact that some process has previously crashed in the current run follows immediately from part (b) of the Validity property of QC. If p decides 0 then from part (a) of the Validity property of QC, some process q proposed 0 in the execution of A that q invoked in line 11. This implies that q decided Q in one of the simulated runs of A that q has in its forest Υq. Recall that these are runs that could have occurred with the current failure pattern. By part (b) of the Validity property of QC, this means that some process has previously crashed in the current run.
(5) If the Ψ-output variable of any process is ever of type (Ω, Σ), then there is a time after which, for every correct process p, Ω-output p is the id of the same correct process. To see this, suppose some Ψ-output becomes of type (Ω, Σ). Then, by (2) and (3) above, eventually the Ψ-output variable of every correct process also become of type (Ω, Σ). So every correct process sets its Ω-output variable repeatedly in line 22 using the extraction procedure described in [3] . Since processes reach line 22, by Lemma 8 in [12] , a critical index exists in the limit forest Υ.
By following the proof of [3] , it can now be shown that eventually all the correct processes extract the id of the same correct process. The only difference is that whenever [3] refers to a bivalent node, we now refer to a multivalent one, and whenever [3] refers to 0-valent versus 1-valent nodes, we refer here to uvalent and v-valent nodes where u, v ∈ {0, 1, Q} and u = v.
(6) If the Ψ-output variable of any process is ever of type (Ω, Σ) then: (a) for every correct process p, there is a time after which Σ-output p contains only correct processes, and (b) for every processes p and q, Σ-output p and Σ-output q always intersect. This is shown in Lemmas 11 and 12 in [12] .
From the above, it is clear that the values of the variables Ψ-output conform to Ψ: For an initial period of time they are equal to ⊥. Eventually, however, they behave either like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes or, if a failure occurs, they may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. Moreover, this switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS is consistent at all processes.
From Theorems 5 and 6, we have:
Corollary 7 For all environments E , Ψ is the weakest failure detector to solve QC in E .
THE WEAKEST FAILURE DETECTOR TO SOLVE NBAC
Specification of NBAC
In the non-blocking atomic commit problem (NBAC), each process invokes the operation VOTE(v), where v ∈ {Yes, No}, which returns either Commit or Abort. It is required that: 
Using FS to relate NBAC and QC
We first show that NBAC is equivalent to the combination of QC and failure detector FS. We then use this result to establish a relationship between the weakest failure detector to solve QC and the one to solve NBAC. (a) The algorithm in Figure 4 uses FS to transform QC into NBAC in E .
(b) It is known that NBAC can be used to implement FS in any environment [5, 11] . Roughly speaking, processes use the given NBAC algorithm repeatedly (forever), voting Yes in each instance. At each process, the output of FS is initially green, and becomes permanently red if and when an instance of NBAC returns Abort. It remains to prove that any solution to NBAC in E can be transformed into a solution to QC in E . This transformation is shown in Figure 5 .
7.3
The weakest failure detector to solve NBAC Theorem 9 For every environment E , if D is the weakest failure detector to solve QC in E , then (D, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC in E .
PROOF SKETCH. Let E be an arbitrary environment, and D be the weakest failure detector to solve QC in E . This means that: (i) D
